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Voter-Verified e-voting Explained

What on earth does voter-verifiable voting mean and why would you want to ask for it? The easiest way to explain this issue is by comparing how e-voting currently is run (and how many countries want to run it in the near future) with how a voter-verified e-vote would be run.

A Typical Electronic Election

diagram of a normal e-vote

1 A voter casts their vote through a computer and clicks to send it.

2 The vote is packaged up and may be encrypted before being sent to a central server. (The vote may be sent as soon as it is cast or in a bunch at the end of an election).

3 All the votes in the server are counted and a result is delivered.

4 If there is any doubt over the result of the election, either due to suspected fraud or a technical problem, there are no votes to examine - only electrons inside the server. A recount on the server will always provide the same result, there is no way to prove or disprove allegations of fraud.


A Voter-Verified Electronic Election

diagram of a normal e-vote

1 A voter casts their vote through a computer and clicks to send it.

2 At this point the vote they wish to cast is, for example, printed and checked by the voter. If the vote on the computer and that on the slip of paper matches then the voter continues... otherwise they discard both and contact an official.

3 The printout of the vote cast is stored in a secure place such as a ballot box. It is vital that the voter doesn't keep the paper (known as the voter-verified audit trail). This is so that they can't prove to someone they have voted a certain way and get paid for it.

4 The electronic vote is sent to the central server to be stored and counted.

5 If there is any doubt over the results from the electronic votes or the result is unusual or particularly close then...

6 ...administrators can go to the securely stored paper votes which should match the electronic votes. The paper votes can be counted and used to check the result. The paper trail protects against errors or hackers changing the electronic result without trace. As a deterrent the paper trail should be checked in random wards or precincts even if the result isn't even under doubt.


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